Nominalist Heuristics and Economic Theory by Robin Pope et al.
 
 














































  Bonn Graduate School of Economics 
  Department of Economics 
  University of Bonn 
  Kaiserstrasse 1 
  D-53113 Bonn
 
Discussion Paper 17/2009 
 

















































  Financial support by the 
  Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) 
  through the 
  Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) 
  is gratefully acknowledged. 
 
  Deutsche Post World Net is a sponsor of the BGSE. Revised version Wednesday, August 5, 2009    Initial Version 23 October 2006 




2 and Sebastian Kube
3  
1  Experimental Economics Laboratory, Bonn University; Address: Walter Flex Str 3, 53113 Bonn, Germany 
  Tels +49-228-731887, +49-228-4462880;  Fax +49-228-4462881; Email Robin.Pope@uni-bonn.de 
2    Experimental Economics Laboratory, Bonn University 
3    Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Bonn University; Max Planck Collective Goods Institute, Bonn 
 
Abstract 
This paper introduces a new theoretic entity, a nominalist heuristic, defined as a focus on prominent numbers, 
indices or ratios.  Abstractions used in the evaluation stage of decision making typically involve nominalist 
heuristics that are incompatible with expected utility theory which excludes the evaluation stage, and are also 
incompatible with prospect theory which assumes that, while the evaluation procedure can involve systematic 
mistakes, the overall decision situation is nevertheless sufficiently simple: 1) for economists and psychologists 
to identify what is a mistake, and 2) to be compatible with maximisation.  But in the typical complex situation 
giving rise to nominalist heuristics neither 1) nor 2) hold, and therefore what is required is a fundamentally 
different class of models that allow for the progressive anticipated changes in knowledge ahead faced under risk 
and uncertainty, namely models under the umbrella of SKAT, the Stages of Knowledge Ahead Theory.  A 
sequel paper. Pope et al 2009b, shows field and laboratory evidence of heuristics in the form of prominent 
numbers entering exchange rate determination. 
Key words  nominalism,  money  illusion,  heuristic,  unpredictability,  experiment,  SKAT  the  Stages  of 
Knowledge  Ahead  Theory,  prominent  numbers,  prominent  indices,  prominent  ratios,  equality, 
historical benchmarks, complexity, decision costs, evaluation. 
JEL Classification   D800, D810, F310, F330  
1   Introduction 
This paper investigates how alternatives are evaluated.  It identifies ways in which prominent 
numbers, indices and ratios may enter the evaluation process.  It shows that the usage of such 
heuristics is not an error in the sense of necessarily yielding an inferior decision.  This is 
because their usage occurs in situations that are too complex for any economist, psychologist 
or other decision maker to ascertain what would be optimal behaviour.  In turn this means that 
we lack a benchmark against which to declare their usage uniformly inferior, so that critiques 
of  decision  makers  (such  as  those  contained  in  prospect  theory)  that  rely  on  scientists 
knowing the right decision, are irrelevant. 
The paper’s layout is as follows.  Part 2 introduces SKAT, the Stages of Knowledge Ahead 
Theory.  It depicts the four stages through which a firm progresses after encountering an 
exchange rate dilemma as regards its importing strategy alternatives, each stage pertaining to 
a change in knowledge ahead.  We furnish field evidence from Savage and other adherents of 
EUT  on  the  importance  of  stage  2,  evaluating  alternatives,  in  complex  situations  where 
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nobody can maximise.  We outline their efforts made to remedy EUT so as to include stage 2 
by (i) a supplementary procedure, namely Savage’s clarifying sure-thing principle, and (ii) a 
temporal backwards extension of EUT, and why efforts (i) and (ii) failed. 
Part 3 introduces a new concept for doing evaluations of alternatives in  stage 2, namely 
nominalist heuristics, which we define as a focus on prominent numbers, indices or ratios.  In 
non-exchange rate applications, we do a literature review to provide field evidence that this 
nominalist  focus  is  not  limited  to  "business"  economists,  but  is  rife  amongst  academic 
economists,  including  ones  using  maximising  models  such  as  EUT,  and  who  are  quite 
unconscious  that  they  are  employing  nominalist  heuristics.  Part  4  offers  an  executive 
summary  for  the  busy  reader.  A  sequel  paper,  Pope  et  al  (2009),  shows  that  nominalist 
heuristics have influenced actual exchange rates through the centuries, and replicates this 
finding in the laboratory. 
 
 
2   SKAT   
SKAT, the Stages of Knowledge Ahead Theory, is presented in Pope (1983), and in more 
detail in Pope (1995), Pope et al (2006 and 2009a) and Pope et al forthcoming.  As dated from 
Pascal’s (1670) pioneering work in the 17
th century, a variety of terminologies have evolved 
over the centuries of decision modelling for some components of SKAT.  Details of those 
different terminologies are in Pope (1996/7 and 2001).  There are many models within EUT 
reflecting differences in the decision situation and the choosers’ von Neumann Morgenstern 
utility mapping.  As illustrated in Pope (1995), multiple models conform to SKAT, reflecting 
the analogous differences in the decision situation and chooser preferences.   
Not all models lie within the SKAT umbrella.  To be within the SKAT umbrella, the model 
must  meet  two  basic  conditions.    First,  it  must  incorporate  the  anticipated  change  in 
knowledge ahead, since this is the defining characteristic of whether the decision-maker faces 
risk / uncertainty.  Second, it must be internally consistent with what the chooser and other 
relevant  parties  know  at  different  times.    Neither  EUT  nor  its  standard  rank  dependent 
extensions meet either of these two basic conditions for modelling risk / uncertainty.  To 
explain these failures of EUT and much non-EUT theorizing, we need first to consider what a 
chooser knows at different stages after encountering a problem until he arrives at certainty. 
 
2.1  Four Epistemic Decision Stages 
In reaching a decision, the chooser goes through a series of epistemic  stages.  To be  an 
epistemic stage, it must be demarcated from the earlier stage and from any later stage by a 
change in the chooser’s knowledge.  Let us take a firm for our chooser.  As the firm solves 
each  stage, something that was unknown before becomes known.  For  example, it has a 
change in its knowledge of the future – it has attained a new stage of knowledge ahead.  There 
are multiple stages, as almost hourly something new is learned.  Here we outline major stages, Pope et al Nominalist Heuristics and Economic Theory    15 July 2008  3 
major changes in the firm’s knowledge ahead. 
For the firm a decision-making process begins with recognition that the future is unknown 
because it has recognized a problem that may warrant action.  When recognition is at an 
unconscious level, the subsequent steps may also be unconscious.  In this paper we consider 
only decisions reached via a conscious process.1   
Recognition of a problem results in stage 1, namely research and negotiation to discover at 
least one available act.  When the firm stops its search for alternatives, it has its first change 
in knowledge ahead – from ignorance of the alternatives, to knowledge of its choice set.  It 
has entered stage 2. 
In  stage  2  it  evaluates  those  alternatives  in  order  to  choose  amongst  them.    After it  has 
evaluated the alternatives and made the choice, it has a second change in knowledge ahead – 
from not knowing what it will choose to having made the decision.  It has entered stage 3.  If 
it chose a risky alternative, it still does not know whether that risky alternative chosen will 
prove lucky.   
Finally the firm learns whether it had luck.  It thus has had a third change in its knowledge 
ahead – from ignorance of what will be its luck to full knowledge ahead (complete certainty).  
It has entered stage 4, the final stage.  See Table 1. 
Table 1 
The Firm’s Four Main Stages of Knowledge Ahead after Recognising a Problem   
       Period                        Activity Stage          Unknown   
1  Pre-Choice Set  Discovering Alternatives  Choice set 
2  Pre-Alternative Chosen  Evaluating Alternatives  Chosen alternative 
3  Pre-Outcome  Waiting to learn if had luck  Later Outcome Segments of Chosen Act if 
Act is Risky 
4  Post-Outcome  Living  with  the  Now  Known 
Outcome of the Chosen Alternative 
Nothing – full knowledge ahead, complete 
certainty (with respect to that problem) 
 
Before stage 4 is reached, there can be a multiplicity of each of the earlier stages, involving 
sub-acts.  In addition Stage 3 may include numerous sub-stages simply because different 
aspects of the outcome may be learned at different times or because the probabilities of the 
outcome space may be progressively revised.   
Choosers also sometimes have scope to revise the original decision, and thus go back to stage 
2, or even back to stage 1.  The economists’ dictum, ignore sunk costs, if taken literally, can 
result  in  the  chooser  beginning  again  each  time  new  information  arrives.    Thereby  the 
economist’s dictum to ignore the sunk costs of having already invested time and resources to 
                                                             
1     When the chooser is an organization, the issue of unconscious choice is that its agent, or a set of its 
agents, makes choices unconsciously.  Neuroscience is embryonic on decision making.  But much of the 
recent evidence points to the stages not being too dissimilar to those yielding conscious decisions, and to 
there being an interaction of the conscious and the unconscious decision stages. Pope et al Nominalist Heuristics and Economic Theory    15 July 2008  4 
reach stage 3 can involve endless iterations of stages 1 to 3 so that stage 4 would never arrive 
with respect to anything.  Law suits, human intolerance for nothing ever being learned, and 
other  similar  factors  however  keep  real  world  agents  away  from  implementing  the 
economists’ dictum of ignoring sunk costs to extreme extents.   
In many circumstances moving backwards and forwards is rare in stages 3 and 4.  Once a 
decision is struck that begins stage 3, the chooser often sticks with it right through to stage 4 
when the risk / uncertainty of that chosen act is resolved.  Such is in contrast to stages 1 and 2 
where moving backwards and forwards is commonplace until stage 3 is entered.  
2.2 Illustration 
As a prelude to our sequel paper, Pope et al 2009, wherein we apply the nominalist theory 
developed in this paper to exchange rate determination, we here illustrate the four decision 
stages – arising out of three principal changes in knowledge ahead – with a situation for our 
firm that involves an exchange rate prediction.  Suppose that our firm has already decided to 
import  an  item  on  credit  for  which  it  must  later  pay  the  bill  denominated  in  a  foreign 
currency.  It recognises that the exchange rate may change before the payment is due.  In 
dealing with its exchange rate uncertainty, our firm enters stage 1 of the decision process of 
ascertaining alternatives.   
After the firm’s first change of knowledge ahead, it has entered stage 2 – has decided what its 
alternative acts are.  Suppose that it enters stage 2 because it has decided that its alternatives 
are in the three broad categories depicted in Table 2.  
Table 2 
Firm’s Choice Set   
Broad Category  Number of Distinct Alternatives in this Category 
1  stay out of the foreign exchange 
market and take what comes as 
the cost of the imports when the 
bill falls due.  
One 
2  “hedge”  against  its  own 
currency  in  case  this 
depreciates so that when the bill 
arrives it would otherwise have 
to pay more.  
Numerous, as it can offer variable amounts of its own currency on 
the foreign exchange market up to its credit limit in borrowing from 
its  domestic  currency  credit  source,  choose  among  different 
exchange  rate  agencies  to  convert  the  funds  and  choose  different 
ways of investing the funds in the foreign country until the bill falls 
due. 
3  “speculate”  on  its  own 
currency appreciating and thus 
decide to borrow money abroad 
and bring that money home.   
Numerous, as it can decide to offer variable amounts of the foreign 
currency  on  the  foreign  exchange  market,  up  to  the  credit  limit 
imposed by its foreign currency credit source, and choose various 
means of executing this and investing the speculative funds at home. 
In stage 2 the firm evaluates these alternatives.  When it has completed the evaluation and 
chosen one of the alternatives in Table 2, it has its second change in knowledge ahead.  It now 
knows  its  chosen  alternative.    It  has  entered  stage  3.  Suppose  it  chose  to  hedge,  ie  an Pope et al Nominalist Heuristics and Economic Theory    15 July 2008  5 
alternative in category 2.  Suppose that within this category it decided to hedge to a limited 
degree  by  borrowing  half  of  the  current  value  of  the  import  bill  in  its  own  currency, 
converting  this  sum  into the  foreign  currency for  investment  in  the  foreign  country  until 
payment for the imported item falls due.   
In stage 3 the firm is waiting to learn whether its chosen alternative brings it luck.  The 
alternative chosen brings it luck if it learns that its currency had depreciated at the time the 
import bill fell due.  Stage 3 ends when the firm finally learns this exchange rate, ie has its 
third change of knowledge ahead.  The firm has entered stage 4, the stage of living with the 
outcome of the risky / uncertain half hedge that it chose. 
At the beginning of stage 4, the firm may learn it had luck, that its hedging reduced the cost of 
the imported good as its own currency indeed had depreciated.  It may learn that it had bad 
luck, that its hedging increased its costs over the alternatives of doing nothing or speculating.  
After this third change in knowledge ahead its future is certain (as regards this issue).  It has 
full knowledge ahead.   
Table 3 summarises the evolution of the firm’s knowledge ahead.  It divides up the firm’s 
future epistemically – in terms of its stages of knowledge ahead.  
 
Table 3 
Three Anticipated Changes in Knowledge Ahead !K1, !K2 and !K3  
(for a firm after deciding to import on credit)     
  from  Pre-Choice Set   Stage  1:  at  best  probabilistic  knowledge  of  what  inquiries  and 
negotiations with banks etc might reveal is in the choice set  
!K1  to   Choice set 
identified 
New epistemic period starts, Stage 2: now knows with a probability 
of 1 the choice set: do nothing, hedge or speculate, and the specific 
option details of each 
         
  from  pre-choice   Stage 2: at best probabilistic knowledge about what the sub-acts of 
evaluating the alternatives will yield as a choice 
!K2  to  choice made: 
half hedge  
New epistemic period starts, Stage 3: now knows with a probability 
of 1 that the choice is the half hedge and its specifics as regards 
risk, uncertainty of whether or not the hedge will turn out to have 
saved money  





pre-outcome   Stage 3: lasting until the exchange rate pertaining when the import 
payment falls due — only probabilistic knowledge of this future 
exchange rate and thus of which later segments of the outcome will 
be  learned  to  be  the  chosen  act's  actual  later  segments  of  the 
outcome flow  
!K3  to  post-outcome   New epistemic period starts, Stage 4: now knows with a probability 
of 1 the exchange rate when the import bill falls due and thus the 
actual later segments of the outcome flow 
either saved money,  
or the half hedge increased the cost of the item imported on credit 
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In Tables 1 and 3, all the alternatives in Table 2 are portrayed as involving uncertainty and 
risk.  Here note that even hedging fully does not eliminate all uncertainties with respect to its 
profit making, customer retention and multiple other goals. Our firm under a full hedge still 
faces the uncertainties that it may have done better to do nothing or speculate as its home 
currency might appreciate – and of whether it will be at a cost disadvantage afterwards in 
deals it can offer its customers if it paid to fully hedge, whiles the other firms speculated, the 
home currency appreciated, and thus its competitors can under price it because of their better 
luck as regards which way the exchange rate moved.   For any alternative in Table 2 to have 
been a sure alternative, our firm would have had to know with certainty the future exchange 
rate at the time when its import bill falls due for payment.  As we shall see in Part 3, there 
does not seem to be any firm (or economist or central banker or government official) with a 
warranted belief in such certainty.   
Suppose however that a firm believed it could predict this future exchange rate with certainty 
and also all the other features of the future pertinent to its half hedge.  Then (even if its 
certainty is unwarranted), it would anticipate its future as containing one less stage and one 
less change in knowledge ahead than is presented in Tables 1 and 3.  Since it has chosen a 
sure alternative, stage 3 of Table 1 does not exist (is degenerate – of zero duration), and in 
Table 3, !K2 likewise does not exist – our firm upon choice has leapt from stage 2 to stage 4, 
experienced !K3, full knowledge ahead.  In summary, to choose a sure alternative is to skip 
stage 3.  To choose a risky alternative – often done because there is no available sure one – is 
to go through stage 3, a period of positive duration, Pope (1985b). 
   
2.4 Timing Consistency Issues 
EUT embodies a false timing simultaneity in what the chooser knows.  Thus the initial full 
axiomatisation of EUT, von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, 1947, 1953, 1972) assumes 
that,  upon  having  chosen  an  alternative,  the  chooser  will  have  all  the  risk  resolved 
simultaneously, at a single future date.  This is correct if all the alternatives in the choice set 
are of a particular sub-set of simple risky acts.  But EUT includes sure alternatives.  In the 
case of choosing a sure act, the chooser knows everything earlier – not in the future that is 
after the point of choice, rather simultaneously with choice.  This renders it infeasible to 
model risky and sure choices together in a theory that permits only a single epistemic period.  
Doing  so  introduces  the  contradiction  of  probabilities  of  the  mutually  exclusive  set  of 
outcomes (that comprise the outcomes space) being simultaneously known and not known.  
Yet  epistemically,  with  one  partial  exception  discussed  in  section  2.6  below,  EUT’s 
axiomatisation is atemporal. 
This results in EUT’s internally contradictory definition of risky alternatives, namely that a 
risky  alternative  is  a  probability  mix  of  sure  alternatives,  Harsanyi  (1977).    This  EUT 
definition mirrors the timing inconsistency in von Neumann and Morgenstern.  EUT fails to 
discern the hallmark of risk – that its non-degenerate probabilities mean that the chooser Pope et al Nominalist Heuristics and Economic Theory    15 July 2008  7 
currently knows something only probabilistically that later the chooser anticipates knowing 
with full certainty.  It is a contradiction in terms to have the concept of a sure alternative – 
one whose outcome is known at the point of choice – combined with the non-degenerate 
probabilities  of  a  risky  alternative,  Pope  (1985b).   This  timing  inconsistency  –  this  false 
simultaneity postulate – recurs in all standard rank dependent extensions of EUT such as 
cumulative prospect theory of Tversky and Kahneman (1992).    
A prerequisite for avoiding such false simultaneity postulates is that at the point in time at 
which  the  modeling  of  the  chooser’s  future  begins,  the  chooser  is  aware  that  there  is 
something that he does not know, but will learn at a future date.2  In turn this implies a 
positive time interval prior to the resolution of that risk / uncertainty.  It implies that the 
chooser’s outcomes flow must begin before stage 4 when all the risk / uncertainty will have 
been resolved.  In other words the model must be epistemically time-wise consistent and thus 
contain a minimum of two distinct epistemic periods.   
Bear in mind the qualifiers epistemic and epistemically consistent.  To be within the SKAT 
umbrella, it is not sufficient for a model to divide up the chooser’s future into numerous 
chronologically  distinct  future  periods.    To  be  within  SKAT,  the  periods  must  be 
epistemically  distinct  –  demarcated  by  changes  in  knowledge.   To  be  within  SKAT,  any 
probability distributions over pertinent outcome spaces must be epistemically consistent.  To 
be epistemically consistent, the model must not violate other axioms (assumptions) in the 
system about what the chooser and other relevant parties know at distinct dates.  In short, for 
models to be epistemically consistent, no chooser can hold or impute to other relevant parties 
simultaneously degenerate and non-degenerate distributions over an outcomes space. 
There is a problem in using theories like EUT that lie outside the SKAT umbrella since they 
embed timing inconsistencies.  The problem goes beyond the aesthetics of liking consistency.  
Timing inconsistencies cause such theories to miss out on key causal chains pertaining to the 
risks and uncertainties that rational reasonable choosers consider.  The remaining sections of 
this part of the paper illustrate these, and efforts to include in EUT what that theory omits. 
 
2.5 The EUT Outcome Segment 
Why EUT embeds timing inconsistencies relates to the fact that it contains only one distinct 
epistemic period.  Utilities (costs and benefits – satisfactions) are derived from outcomes that 
matter to the chooser.  The chooser does not spring into existence in stage 4.  The chooser has 
utilities from the beginning of stage 1.  There is an outcome flow, with the first segment being 
in stage 1, the second in stage 2, the third in stage 3, and the fourth in stage 4.  (Of course for 
some decision situations it is worthwhile to subdivide each of these epistemically distinct 
segments of the outcomes flow into smaller segments). 
Its axiomatic base constrains EUT to include in its outcomes flow only the final stage of 
                                                             
2  This is in the simplest risky / uncertain situations – in some more complicated ones, the chooser may merely 
anticipate in the future having a change in his degree of knowledge of the outcome, and not anticipate ever 
knowing it fully – eg in cases where the outcome is the truth of a hypothesis that the chooser, a scientist, is 
investigating, Pope (1988). Pope et al Nominalist Heuristics and Economic Theory    15 July 2008  8 
knowledge ahead, only stage 4 – only the last row of Tables 2 and 3, namely the outcome 
segments that will occur after all risk and uncertainty will be in the past.  This is because 
EUT’s axiomatic implications include: (i), a restriction of the outcome flow to those segments 
that occur after all risk is resolved, Samuelson (1952a); and (ii), a restriction that each of 
these post risk segments must be evaluated “as if certain”, even though uncertain at the point 
of choice, Friedman and Savage (1948), Samuelson (1952a).3  Restrictions (i) and (ii) hold 
also  for  most  extensions  of  EUT  such  as  cumulative  prospect  theory.  Many  scientists 
inadvertently  violate  the  extreme  epistemic  constraints  of  EUT,  and  thus  construct 
epistemically inconsistent models that they erroneously describe as within the framework of 
EUT.  But in fact such models lie outside both SKAT and EUT. 
EUT’s  omission  of  the  three  earlier  stages  implies  that  there  are  no  satisfactions  and 
dissatisfactions  that  should  be  considered  by  the  chooser  before  the  final  era  when  all 
uncertainty is past.  Thus EUT implies that there are no costs, no benefits in stage 1 of 
ascertaining the choice set, nor in stage 2 of evaluating each alternative in that choice set, nor 
in stage 3 of enduring or enjoying the period of risk / uncertainty after choosing and prior to 
learning whether the lucky outcome has ensued from the risky act chosen.  (Stage 3 does not 
exist – is degenerate (ie of zero duration) – if a sure act is chosen.) 
It might be thought that models within EUT can include all stage 4 effects.  This however is 
not the case.  The earlier stages 1, 2 and 3 all have historical legacies, ie effects on the 
chooser in stage 4.  Table 4 illustrates. 
Table 4 
Historical Legacies in Stage 4 from the Earlier Three Stages 
stage 1 that lasts until the chooser stops searching for new alternatives and declares his choice set.   
The historical legacies in stage 4 of the chooser’s sub-acts of searching in stage 1 can include 
being blamed (fired) for having failed to negotiate / discover or praised (promoted) for having 
succeeded in negotiating / discovering desirable alternatives.  The chooser only experiences 
most of these historical legacies as late as stage 4 because it is only after the chooser and 
others notice that other alternatives not in the choice set would or might have been better or 
worse. 
stage 2  that lasts until the chooser stops evaluating the alternatives and makes a choice 
The historical legacies in stage 4 of the chooser’s sub-acts of evaluating in stage 2 can include 
being blamed (fired) for having evaluated in a way that led to rejection of an alternative that 
subsequently (by stage 4) the chooser or other relevant parties learn would have been superior 
or praised (promoted if later alternatives rejected are learned to have been inferior. 
stage 3 that lasts until the risk / uncertainty in the chosen act is resolved 
The historical legacies in stage 4 of going through stage 3 of not knowing whether the chosen 
risky act’s outcome will be good or bad can include repayment of loans with a risk premium.  
Lenders charge our firm interest on funds borrowed to hedge or speculate – interest inclusive 
of a risk premium as the lender does not know for sure that our firm will repay.  Our firm will 
only contingently repay – repay provided it is not bankrupt.  Without a stage 3, interest repaid 
in stage 4 if the outcome is good enough to enable repayment, would be less.  It would be a 
risk-free interest rate.  (Risk premia have to be exogenous “somethings” not connected to risk 
in EUT models.)4 
 
                                                             
3  See Pope (2004) on the alternative Ramsey version of EUT.  His version has the like property of precluding 
attaching a different utility to an outcome depending on its degree of risk, uncertainty. 
4  There  is a  literature of EUT-inspired  models  seeking to endogenise risk premia and related phenomena.  
These are valuable contributions, but ones hampered (like the EUT-inspired search models) by a failure to 
notice that they in fact contradict the EUT axioms. Pope et al Nominalist Heuristics and Economic Theory    15 July 2008  9 
2.6  Models of Stage 3 Effects 
As  we  noted  in  section  2.4,  EUT  fails  to  include  even  stage  3.    EUT  is  instead  as  von 
Neumann  and  Morgenstern  had  observed  a  static,  atemporal  theory.    Kreps  and  Porteus 
(1978,  1979)  extended  EUT  to  include  some  temporal  features.  Kreps  and  Porteus 
axiomatically  derive  a  dated  (temporal)  version  of  the  atemporal  EUT  property  that  lies 
outside SKAT since one of Kreps and Porteus’ assumptions concerns a two-stage gamble that 
thus  implies  sequential  unfolding  of  the  two  stages  yet  as  they  themselves  note  in  their 
conclusions,  they  assume  the  two  stages  occur  simultaneously.    They  obtain  results  that 
coincide with what a chooser employing SKAT might reasonably decide taking into account 
one of the stage 3 effects that EUT necessarily omits, namely planning difficulties.  The 
Kreps and Porteus models succeed in making choices that coincide with those made under a 
rational model of SKAT for a limited sub-set of these planning difficulties.  But in addition to 
the problem of its false simultaneity assumption, this dated version of EUT has the drawback 
that  it  has  proved  too  complicated  for  general  understanding  or  adoption.    One  recent 
extension of their approach is Klibanoff and Ozdenoren (2007).   
Earlier, Keynes looked into stage 3 experiences of firms (1936, 1939).  It resulted in his 
constructing a non-EUT theory based on the risky or uncertain stage 3 that a firm endures 
when it chooses the risky act of production for investment, and a firm avoids if instead it 
chooses  the  safe  act  (according  to  his  theory),  of  production  for  consumption.  Keynes’ 
concern about stage 3 uncertainty effects has attracted a limited amount of interest, Walsh 
(1996, pp52-65), and there has been in addition an appreciation that the mainstream tradition 
sidesteps key implications of investor uncertainty, eg Davidson (1984, 1988, 1991, 1993, 
1996, 2008). 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern had wanted to  include stage 3 so as to include a  set of 
satisfactions that they termed by various names including the specific utility of gambling.  
However they encountered a contradiction that they were unable to solve on this “level”, and 
so left the task to future researchers, (1947, 1953, 1972, pp628-32).  Pope (1985b) shows that 
introducing  stage  3  permits  the  analyst  to  discern  that  during  this  stage  the  alternative 
(mutually exclusive) outcomes interact in the mind of the chooser.  This is permitted since in 
stage  3  the  distribution  is  non-degenerate.    That  distribution  of  outcomes  only  becomes 
degenerate at the beginning of stage 4. 
 
2.7   Models of Stage 1 
Stage 1, identifying the choice set, has branched in three directions.  One is into satisficing 
models – stop when a good enough alternative has been located, eg Simon (1955).  A second 
is into aspiration-adaptation models, eg Sauermann and Selten (1962), Selten (1998), with an 
urgency  order  of  improvements  and  a  retreat  variable.    A  third  is  inspired  by  EUT,  but Pope et al Nominalist Heuristics and Economic Theory    15 July 2008  10 
violates the EUT axioms as it concerns a stage before all risk is past.  These are models in 
which the search continues until the expected benefits of searching exceed the expected costs.  
The EUT-inspired search model comprises a set of steps.  Step 1 identifies some probabilistic 
benefits and costs of searching in a specified way.  Step 2 identifies probabilistic benefits and 
costs of discovering with more confidence what those original probability distributions were, 
or of another way of search. ….  This is an endless regress of evaluating more and more the 
benefits and costs of search, Simon (1991, 1993).  It avoids being an endless regress in actual 
EUT-inspired search models of stage 1 because (somehow in the unconscious) the searcher is 
assumed to know that certain formulae correctly capture these expected benefits and costs – 
and do not themselves require further search, further evaluation.   
All three approaches to stage 1, satisficing, aspiration-adaptation and EUT-inspired search 
models are alike in that their current batch of models assumes that stage 2 is non-existent, 
superfluous.    All  three  assume  that  the  chooser  already  has  an  evaluation  of  identified 
alternatives, of which to choose.  
To see this, consider first the satisficing model of Simon (1955).  It makes no distinction as 
regards the timing or the expense of identifying an alternative and being able to classify that 
alternative as either satisfactory or unsatisfactory.  On locating an alternative, the satisficing 
firm thus has no need to evaluate it.  On locating an alternative it has simultaneously and 
costlessly ascertained whether it is satisfactory.   
Likewise in the path-dependent aspiration-adaptation model of Sauermann and Selten (1962) 
and Selten (1998), our firm would be assumed at every decision time point to have already an 
order of urgency as regards improvements and as regards a retreat variable.  Thus each time a 
firm completes its search procedure of discovering what is feasible, it has no additional stage 
2 evaluation to do.  If it discovered that moving up is feasible, it already knows that if it has to 
choose between different upward directions, and already knows which upward directions are 
higher on its urgency scale.  Again, if retreating is all that is feasible, and it does not have to 
retreat in all dimensions, our firm already knows its retreat variable.  It has no need to do a 
stage 2 evaluation in order to discover its desired advance or retreat steps.    
Similarly in the EUT-inspired search models, our firm already has its preference order.  In 
these  models  often  the  alternatives  are  modeled  as  naturally  uni-dimensional.    Eg  in  the 
labour search theories, the alternatives may be net money amounts probabilistically received 
under each situation, simultaneously and costlessly evaluated by their expected utilities.   
 
2.8  Literature on Stage 2 
Research on stage 2, evaluating alternatives, includes learning, and whether choosers: 1, use 
integrated  maximizing  calculations  and  numerically  weight  the  multiple  dimensions  of 
alternatives, eg Cyert and March (1963), Borcherding and Winterfeldt (1988), Weber and 
Borcherding (1993), Brandstätter, Gigerenzer and Hertwig (2006), Pope, Leitner and Leopold Pope et al Nominalist Heuristics and Economic Theory    15 July 2008  11 
(2006); 2, edit out common components of alternatives, eg Birnbaum and Navarreté (1998); 
3, structure by dominance, eg Huber (1982); 4, form reference points related to some status 
quo, eg Inder and O’Brien (2003); 5, use prominent numbers (see section 3.8.2 below); 6, 
include anticipated risk and uncertainty effects from going through stages 2 and 3 prior to 
attaining the certainty of stage 4, eg Bell (1981), Pope (1983), Conlisk (1993), Pope (2001); 
Camille,  Coricelli,  Sallet,  Pradat-Diehl,  Duhamel  and  Sirigu  (2004),  Pope,  Leitner  and 
Leopold (2006).  
 
2.9  Efforts to Include Stage 2 in EUT 
With satisficing and aspiration-adaptation models, there is no bar on extending the approach 
forwards to stage 2, the evaluation procedure.  It is merely a matter that research on this 
extension is largely in the “planned to be done” basket.  By contrast, quite a deal of literature 
already exists on efforts to supplement or extend EUT so as to take account of stage 2.   
As  already  explained  in  section  2.5  above,  EUT  cannot  itself  be  extended  backwards  to 
include stage 2 since this would violate its axioms that restrict the outcomes flow to begin in 
stage 4. Such a backwards extension would be tantamount to elaborating or redefining the 
outcomes.  Thereby the backwards extension would violate the axiomatic base given EUT’s 
constraints (i) and (ii) listed in section 2.5 above, Pope (2000).  Further, even if one ignores 
the  axiomatic  constraints,  using  an  EUT-inspired  approach  to  stage  2  would  simply  re-
introduce  –  but  in  a  more  salient  fashion  –  the  difficulties  of  those  EUT-inspired  search 
models of stage 1 (that violate the EUT axioms, and thus lie outside EUT).  This is because an 
EUT-inspired stage 2 would need to involve expected utilities of the costs and benefits of 
doing a better evaluation.  But as already discussed in section 2.7, this is an endless regress.  
Each set of such expected costs and benefits rests on an earlier set. 
In short EUT itself cannot be extended backwards to include stage 2.  An outside EUT, but 
EUT-inspired stage 2 optimising model would be subject to the endless regress problem.  Yet 
EUT’s need for a complementary stage 2 model is acute.  It is far less plausible to be without 
a stage 2 process under EUT than under the non-optimising approaches of satisficing and 
aspiration-adaptation  models.    This  is  because  under  EUT  the  required  knowledge  of 
preferences  is  more  precise  and  comprehensive  than  under  satisficing  and  aspiration-
adaptation models.  EUT’s axiomatic base requires the evaluation of each alternative to be: 
Condensable to a Single Utility Dimension; 
Numerically Precise –  mappable into a single utility number, with the set of numbers in 
most axiomatisations unique apart from scale and origin; and 
Comprehensive in 
extent – there must be an evaluation of every conceivable alternative, not 
merely of every actual alternative, and  
depth –  each  alternative  must  comprise  chronological  sequences  of 
alternatives to the end of the chooser’s life.   
The chronological depth condition stems from the admission of Samuelson and Savage that 
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(1952b), Savage (1952b, 1954).   However the depth requirement itself violates the EUT 
axioms, Pope (2006). 
The technicalities of how a chooser could already instantly costlessly know his preferences 
over any infinite set, let alone know these with a reduction of his multiple goals to a single 
dimension  with  such  precision  and  chronological  depth  has  been  a  matter  of  interest.  
Supporters of EUT resort to a black box hypothesis of saying that somehow this happens 
unconsciously in the brain.  EUT critic, de Neufville (1983), describes this EUT assumption 
of instant costless access to preferences so that zero evaluation of alternatives is required, as 
“look in a book” utilities.  Black (1986) demonstrates that such EUT preferences would be 
beyond the capacity of any academic, even if the academic’s preferences to the end of his life 
simply pertained to ranking all the books in a small bookstore.  Savage (1954, 1972) has 
admitted that EUT is too complex to use even for planning a picnic. 
It has been easy to overlook how precise and comprehensive is the EUT preference condition, 
and thus to miss the force of the point being made by de Neufville, Black and Savage.  It has 
been easy to overlook because economists typically formulate decision situations in which all 
the multiple dimensions of a book’s appeal to an individual are ignored, all the multiple 
dimensions of a firm’s goals (as regards long run profits, short-term customer retention, ….) 
rest  unmodelled,  and  all  the  chronological  depth  complexity  is  non-existent.    Instead 
economists have focused on situations in which the chooser’s outcomes flow is assumed to be 
already a univariate net monetary amount and chronological depth is almost a non-issue either 
because the chooser lives to eternity in an ultra simple ergodic world,5 or because the model 
ignores the EUT constraint of a single-for-life choice, and concerns a one-off choice over a 
small world segment of the future.   
The possibility of a small world variant of EUT was introduced by Savage.  He hoped that 
appeal to a small world would make EUT more practical.  But he consigned operationalising 
the notion of a small world to future researchers.  He reported that he had found the matter of 
defining a small world compatible with the axioms too difficult, Savage (1954, 1972).   
Recently  work  on  under  which  the  representation  of  the  world  available  to  a  boundedly 
rational decisionmaker, whose awareness increases over time, constitutes an adequate ‘small 
world’  in  the  sense  of  Savage  (1954)  for  the  assessment  of  a  given  decision,  Grant  and 
Quiggin (2008).   They find the conditions required to be “quite stringent” and in effect 
unknowable  to  the  non-omniscient  decisionmaker.    In  short  their  investigations  lend  no 
support to the notion that Savage’s small worlds can be operationalised in order to revive 
EUT. 
The small world that has not become operational was not Savage’s only effort to address the 
                                                             
5 The term was developed by the Moscow School of Probability in 1935.  Ergodicity implies that samples drawn 
from past and current data furnish statistically reliable forecasts since economic time series are stationary.  For 
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obvious need for EUT to have a stage 2, to have a procedure for evaluating alternatives.  His 
other effort was to go outside EUT and complement it with a different stage 2 procedure.  To 
this end he constructed what he described as an “extra logical loose” clarifying procedure, 
Savage (1954, 1972).  He called it the sure thing principle.   
The  construction  arose  because  at  a  Paris  conference  in  1952,  Allais  alerted  him  that 
complementing  EUT  with  a  stage  2  was  essential  if  choosers  were  to  conform  to  EUT. 
Savage was startled to discover that his joint pair of choices to simple questions from Allais 
violated EUT.  Savage concluded that he wished to obey EUT, but that he had made an error 
in stage 2, and wrongly evaluated the alternatives.  He constructed his unaxiomatised sure 
thing clarifying principle to supplement / precede use of EUT. Friedman and Savage (1952) 
found the principle so enlightening that “the Greeks must surely have had a name for it”.   
The authors of this paper however are unaware of evidence of its use in practice by firms.  
Nor is it not invariably “clarifying” in the manner that Savage anticipated, Hagen (1972).  
Whenever it does “clarify”, it does so by truncating the probability distribution and generating 
an illusion of certainty.  It clarifies by enticing the chooser to select an alternative because a 
modified variant on the alternative is guaranteed, when in fact the actual alternative itself is 
risky, Pope (1991).  So the principle is irrational, something to be avoided by any sensible 
firm in its stage 2 evaluation process.   
Indeed the sure thing principle is doubly irrational for one like Savage wishing to obey EUT, 
since those axioms impose the condition that a  person is indifferent between whether an 
outcome is risky or sure.  This is a bizarre counterintuitive feature of EUT.  It can only seem a 
natural condition to impose when it is appreciated that under EUT the only segment of the 
outcome flow included is that segment that will occur after all risk will be passed.  Thereby 
EUT excludes consideration of all the prior outcome segments when risk will still be present 
and thus matter, Pope (1991). 
There is also the issue that the sure thing principle is at a level of generality that gives our 
firm no assistance in its particular evaluation task.  Our firm has to evaluate exceedingly 
complex alternatives relative to the trivial social gambling alternatives that Allais posed to 
Savage.  In Allais’ pair of alternatives, already the exact probabilities of all the outcomes 
were known.   
By contrast our firm, with the choice set of Table 2, has to choose between the three broad 
categories: 1, do nothing; 2, hedge; and 3 speculate.  Our firm needs to consider whether it 
seems more likely that its own currency will significantly appreciate or more likely that it will 
significantly depreciate.  This is a daunting part of reaching a decision, costly and dangerous.  
It lacks the props of Savage in 1952 in choosing amongst Allais’ alternatives, the props of 
knowing precisely all the probabilities that are pertinent.  Instead, in order to get to first base 
in its evaluation process, in stage 2 our firm has to discover what probabilities or qualitative 
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move.  This difficult process mirrors many other decision situations in which, stage 2, the 
evaluation process, is costly in emotional and material resources, Janis and Mann (1977), 
Simon (1991, 1993).   
 
3   Nominalism 
Our firm has to evaluate.  It has to evaluate in order to choose to do nothing, or to hedge, or to 
speculate.  In this complex situation of needing to predict a future exchange rate in order to 
choose amongst its alternatives, what evaluation procedure might our firm adopt?  We have 
shown in Part 2 that EUT cannot itself help, as stage 2, evaluating alternatives, lies outside its 
axioms.    We  have  also  shown  that  EUT-inspired  approaches  to  stage  2  in  the  form  of 
procedures that might complement EUT while distinct from EUT, namely the maximizing 
expected  benefits  minus  costs  approach  to  evaluation,  and  Savage’s  clarifying  sure  thing 
principle, would be positively harmful for our firm.  In a sequel paper, Pope et al (2009), we 
have shown that our firm lacks a robust verified means of obtaining a probability distribution 
over the outcomes space of where the pertinent exchange rate might lie when its import bill 
falls due.  What then might our firm do in forming this probability distribution, or in forming 
some qualitative counterpart of such a probability distribution in order to grapple with the 
unknown future exchange rate?  It can resort to analyses for which in this paper we coin the 
term nominalism.  
 
3.1  The Concept 
Nominalism we define differently from money illusion.  We define it as attention to one or 
more prominent numbers, indices or ratios.  The prominence can arise from the numbers 
themselves, from historical events, or from the modelling abstraction process.  Every theory 
abstracts, and in the case of most economic theories, this means that it pays less attention to 
some numbers, indices and ratios than would a less abstract theory that includes more of the 
cause-effect  chains  and  more  details  on  how  each  chain  operates.    Many  instances  of 
decision-making, including those of scientists in constructing, using, testing and estimating 
theories  exhibit  nominalism.    We  cannot  have  a  theory  of  what  causes  what  without 
abstracting.  Since most economic modelling involves numbers, indices and ratios, what we 
term nominalism in this paper thus can also be termed economic modelling abstraction.   
There is however a distinction in connotation. The term abstraction has no generally accepted 
connotation of praise or blame in economics.  It has often a neutral connotation.  It has often a 
positive  connotation,  eg  when  scientists  assert  that  abstraction  is  the  essence  of  good 
theoretical and empirical work.  It can have a negative connotation, as when scientists find 
some  particular  piece  of  theorizing  so  abstract  that  it  “throws  out  the  baby  with  the 
bathwater”.  Einstein, quoted in Allais (1984) made such a criticism.  Allais was quoting 
Einstein, since he wished to alert his EUT colleagues to the issue that EUT might be elegantly 
simple in its abstractness, but too simple to be useful for scientific purposes.   
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connotation.  We economists use nominalism to refer to instances in which we ourselves (as 
superior decision makers) look down on others who abstract inappropriately – who failed to 
consider as many factors as we deem pertinent.  We also use nominalism to refer to instances 
in  which  we  know  that  other  economists  would  condemn  decision  makers  for  having 
inappropriately abstracted – even if we ourselves refrain from judging whether the abstraction 
was inappropriate, or even praise it.   
 
 
3.2  The Rationality Issue 
Keynes in 1936 gave centre stage to one form of potential nominalism, namely trade union 
leaders’ attention to the money wage number without equal attention to the associated cost of 
living number, in his General Theory.  There are overtones of irrationality in Keynes terming 
this instance of nominalism “money illusion”.  He did however argue that it was a sensible 
strategy for the trade union leaders.  It was sensible due to aggregation effects from the wage 
bargaining outcomes of its different trade unions.  Ie he argued that trade union leaders' focus 
on nominal wages was not undue. 
We likewise refrain from describing all abstraction in the form of restricting attention to 
prominent numbers, indices and ratios as an undue focus – as necessarily unreasonable or 
irrational.  There may be the sorts of aggregation effects that Keynes identified.  Further, 
restricting attention to prominent numbers, indices and ratios saves on evaluation costs in 
ways not accounted for yet in most of our theorizing.  It is frequently infeasible to avoid 
restricting attention to prominent numbers, indices and ratios.  We are “guilty” of it almost 
whenever  we  theorise  in  economics.    No  economic  theory  includes  all  relevant  number 
relations.  Any economic theory abstracts and assumes some numbers move together when in 
fact they do not.  Sometimes such restricted attention to prominent numbers, indices and 
ratios  captures  the  essential  stylized  features  of  the  economy  and  renders  understanding, 
robust predictions and policy advice.  Sometimes it fails, and yields the reverse. 
Nor can choosers making decisions outside economic research and policy work refrain from 
restricting their attention to prominent numbers, indices and ratios.  Thus issues concerning 
rationality,  concerning  what  we  define  as  nominalist  heuristics,  can  only  be  those  of 
identifying when the focus is unduly restricted.  The answers will depend on the specifics.  
 
3.3 Nominalism in the “Real” Variable Concept 
There are of course numerous instances in which restricted attention to a prominent number, 
index or ratio yields inferior decisions, understandings, and predictions.  We give but two 
examples.  Both have the irony that a nominalist short cut is given the positive connotation of 
being  superior  because  paying  attention  to  two  numbers,  not  merely  one,  and  as  a 
consequence is called real, as distinct from nominal.  Both however in some situations yield 
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3.3.1 The Real Interest Rate 
The real interest rate is defined as the interest rate less the rate of inflation.  It is a nominalist 
short-cut.  There are numerous anticipated rates of inflation that might be used to deflate an 
interest rate.  Each is highly controversial as it involves anticipations, and assumes that there 
is some particular set of prices whose future movement matters for all borrowers and lenders.  
The  Australian  Treasury  for  instance  found  on  its  investigations  that  introducing  the 
nominalist short-cut of a real interest rate into  economic incentives in taxation would be 
counter-efficient.  But economists seeking the simplicity of tractable models, ignore such 
findings, ie ignore most of the variables and thus numbers that matter for borrowers and 
lenders, and rather routinely take the nominalist short-cut and analyse with “real” interest 
rates. 
3.3.2 The Real Exchange Rate 
The real exchange rate denotes the nominal exchange rate divided by either a traded goods 
price index; a consumer price index; a wage index; a wholesale price index, and also by 
various other domestic price indices.  These diverse price indices typically move in markedly 
different ways.  But it is quite common in both theoretical and empirical studies employing a 
“real” exchange rate to not even mention which particular price index was used to generate 
the “real” exchange rate.  The nominalist practice of analyzing with “real” exchange rates 
thus  ignores  many  other  pertinent  numbers.    It  ignores  distinctions  between  prices  for 
intermediate goods such as imports, exports, the prices for final consumer goods, and the 
price  of  labour,  and  the  disproportionately  high  use  of  importable  and  exportables  by  a 
country’s import-competing sector.   
As  with  “real”  interest  rate  analyses,  the  defence  is  that  the  "real”  exchange  rate  is  less 
nominalist and thus more informative than simply using the nominal exchange rate.  This 
however is not necessarily the case.  The nominalist short-cut of analyzing the tradeable 
sector via a "real” exchange rate as if there were only one price deflator for all inputs and 
outputs of the import and export sector and the other complementary and competing sectors 
of the economy can yield false conclusions. 
Analyses employing the nominalist “real” exchange rates yield the conclusion that the import 
competing local manufacturing sector benefits from exchange rate depreciations – and yield 
the IMF advice that countries seeking to expand local manufacturing ought depreciate.  But 
for countries like Australia, and some developing countries, this depreciation decision arising 
out  of  nominalist  real  exchange  rate  modelling  can  be  the  wrong  one  to  take.    There  is 
evidence  suggesting  that  a  depreciation  can  contract  the  local  manufacturing  sector,  the 
reverse of the typical IMF goal, in countries where the export sector is primarily commodities 
(agricultural,  mining  and  so  forth)  and  exporters  have  expenditure-smoothing  capacities.  
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from the export sector accordingly conforms to the Smithies-Friedman theory of insensitivity 
to short run profit fluctuations, Smithies (1945), Friedman (1957).  The net effect is that the 
import  competing  local  manufacturing  sector  whose  costs  are  primarily  importables  and 
exportables, can contract markedly with depreciations (which raise costs but not demand), 
expands markedly with appreciations, Pope (1981, 1985a, 1987), Pope and Selten (2002).  
 
3.4  Money Illusion 
As regards money illusion, there is qualitative field corroboration, eg Fisher (1929).  There is 
econometric corroboration, eg estimates of the Australian consumption function, Johnston 
and  Looker  (1979).    There  is  questionnaire  corroboration  over  a  range  of  hypothetical 
consumption and investment decisions, eg Shafir, Diamond and Tversky (1997).  There is 
corroboration from laboratory experiments, eg Fehr and Tyran (2001), Mekvabishvili (2006). 
3.5 Base Illusion 
Some economists and financial analysts rank countries as having been more successful on the 
basis of growth rate number.  They make no allowance for whether the country was in a 
recession or a boom in the earlier period taken as the base number.  (Central Banks are also 
prone to present and analyse data in such a change format!)  Such nominalism can yield copy-
cat fluctuations in economic regimes.  When one country is at the top of the league (often 
simply because in the base period it had been performing badly), the other countries try to 
copy its industrial structure, attributing all its growth success to these industrial features.  
Thus  when  corporatist  continental  Europe  and  Japan  were  growing  faster  than  English 
speaking  countries,  there  was  interest  in  changing  the  business  environment  in  English 
speaking countries toward in the longer term investment perspective and the less hierarchical 
workplace structures of these countries and their lower percentage of managers, especially a 
lower percentage of managers from non MBA-style backgrounds.  When later the US and the 
UK had growth spurts (after severe slowdowns), interest heightened in deregulating Japan and 
continental Europe so as to mirror the business environment in English speaking countries.   
Less  nominalist  economists  warn  against  excessive  copy-cat  behaviour.    They  warn  that 
undue attention is being paid to short-run growth rates in the countries growing fast.  They 
warn that that ignores attention to other numbers, namely whether the base was temporarily 




Inertia  after  price  incentives  change  is  justifiable  under  assumptions  of  fully  “rational” 
optimizing choosers who have costlessly precisely calculated all the costs of shifting to a new 
“equilibrium”  and  decided  that  the  transactions  and  other  costs  exceed  the  benefits  of 
responding,  eg  Constantanides  (1979,  1986).   But  such  assumptions  are  unrealistic:  most 
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price changes, little knowledge of the transition costs of response, and so forth.  Inertia leads 
them to simply consider the current numbers and number ratios.  A prime example is the 
popular optimal currency area model of Mundell (1961).  Herein for countries outside the 
optimal currency area, after the equilibrating exchange rate change, people are assumed to 
never expect another exchange rate change.  Failure to recognise the implausibility, indeed 
falsity, of this nominalist heuristic, has resulted in beggar-thy-neighbour usage of exchange 
rate changes, Pope (2008), and has aided in retention of multiple currencies, when there is 
evidence that a single currency would better maintain international competitiveness, Pope et 
al (2008). 
3.7   Nominal Equality 
When  short  of  a  means  for  progressing  toward  predictions,  nominalism  enters  much  of 
physics in the form of postulating symmetries in the behaviour of entities.  In turn these 
postulated symmetries can involve giving numbers to other ratios and quantities entailed by 
those symmetries (typically not prominent numbers) when otherwise a wider range of values 
would  need  to  be  taken  into  account.    Symmetries  and  related  aesthetics  issues  (such  as 
simplicity and elegance) enter formal economic theorizing.  As Manne and Charnes (1952) 
and Allais (1984) observe critically, these postulated symmetries and aesthetics often result in 
a severe, even extreme restriction, on the number of relations and associated quantities that 
are considered.   
Symmetries  in  the  form  of  identity  transforms –  equality  generators  –  are  widespread  in 
society where there is no clear fixed pie to divide up fairly, eg because of the irreducibly 
multi-dimensional  nature  of  the  pie.    Civil,  criminal  and  tax  law  often  treats  everyone 
identically in some dimensions.  Organisations often impose identity on all employees as 
regards  matters  like  working  hours,  holidays  and  sick  leave.    In  negotiations,  successful 
agents tend to structure their steps of retreat from their initial demands in a manner that, 
among other things, enables in effect a 1:1 exchange of concessions as both parties retreat 
from their basket of initial demands to the final solution.   
Tietz (1972, 1982, 1997) formulates aspiration tiers that bargainers employ in conducting 
their retreats from initial positions to (when successful) an agreement.  Tietz’s conception of 
aspiration is not nominalist.  However when actual bargainers formulate their aspiration tiers 
prominent  numbers  naturally  they  enter.    A  union  for  instance  does  not  request  a  non-
prominent percentage wage increase such as 3.7643% rise as its opening gambit, but rather a 
round number.  Tietz is however explicit about the role of a prominent ratio appearing in the 
final step in achievement of agreement, namely that frequently in the final step there is an 
agreement on a fifty-fifty split of the difference between what the two parties offered in the 
preceding round. 
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3.8  Prominent Numbers 
3.8.1  Historical Prominence 
Decisive  historical  events  lend  prominence  to  some  numbers  and  result  in  nominalist 
benchmarking. Eg typically the public has no precise notion of what prices were the previous 
week, month or year when inflation is mild and so operate for extended periods of time as if 
there were no inflation in their budget allocations and the resultant aggregate consumption 
flows, Johnston and Looker (1979).  If however there is a change of currency, the public can 
remember  prices  vividly  at  the  historically  prominent  date  of  the  changeover.    They 
benchmark  inflation  as  the  price  increase  since  that  changeover  price  number.    The 
changeover date becomes progressively more distant.   
This sort of nominalism has entered public perception of whether the Euro’s introduction 
caused a price spurt.  There indeed was such a spurt in the prices of some items.  But the 
extent of the spurt and the range of items whose prices leapt (in those countries that failed to 
impose a price freeze) became exaggerated in people’s perceptions, partly through a historical 
benchmarking form of nominalism.  The public lacked comparable precision in their notions 
of how much prices had risen per week, year, triennium prior to the introduction of the Euro.  
Implicitly the public put that prior inflation rate number at zero in reaching their inference 
that  the  arrival  of  the  Euro  notes  and  coins  has  been  inflationary.   On  Germany,  see  eg 
Brachinger (2006), and on other countries that introduced the Euro, see eg Cestari (2006), 
Marques (2006).   
Memories tend to be short.  In estimating inflation, this can lead to an overweighting of items 
more frequently paid for, since they will have been over-represented in the recent past out-
payments.  Even if memory is longer, in combining different prices together, people may 
weight their importance by how often they pay for such items, giving higher prominence to 
those for which historically they most often pay out money, not weighting items in proportion 
to their overall expenditure.  Greater prominence to items paid for more frequently can be 
inferred from German perceptions of inflation, Brachinger (2006).   
The benchmarking of inflation by the historically prominent numbers at the time of the Euro's 
introduction, and the over-weighting of frequently bought items in estimating inflation can be 
branded as cases of mistakes in the following sense.  People seek to understand matters such 
as the introduction of the Euro and have less well understood its inflationary impact if they 
have inadvertently used misleading prominent numbers.  If this caused enough anger, it could 
even  upset  macroeconomic  management  by  undermining  confidence  in  the  Euro  region, 
Brachinger (2006).  
Some other usages of prominent numbers cannot so unambiguously be labelled as mistakes.  
Take  cases  when  inflation  is  insufficiently  prominent,  and  thus  ignored.    The  historical 
benchmarks of prior price numbers may not be readily at hand.  Provided that price changes 
do not show a dramatic systematic trend, there is evidence that firms look at prices in levels, 
not  in rates  of  change, Pope  (1981,  1985a,  1987).   Firms  however  may  do  better  not  to Pope et al Nominalist Heuristics and Economic Theory    15 July 2008  20 
attempt to track small historical changes in inflation and project a continuation of these in 
formulating  their  own  purchasing  and  price  setting  strategies.    The  costs  of  mistakes  of 
overestimating any continuation of modest upward price trends may outweigh any benefits. 
Historical rather than replacement cost accounting of inventories, equipment and buildings 
involves such nominalism.  It economises on resources and when replacement costs can be 
transiently high as in a bubble, happen on occasion to serve the firm better than if it attempts 
to ascertain current prices.  Of course, in high inflation eras, such nominalism can instead 
bankrupt the firm.  In short, there is no facile rule of thumb, on when a nominalist heuristic is 
helpful, when damaging. 
 
3.8.2  Prominence in the Numbers Themselves 
Prominent numbers are those used more often than others.  Which numbers are prominent 
depends  (a)  on  culture,  religion  and  scientific understanding  as  these  determine  which 
numbers are lucky, or sacred or have fiduciary power, (b) on the number system including 
whether it has a base of four, ten, or a unique reference value of the decision problem, and (c) 
on the range within which numerical responses are selected. The restriction of attention to 
prominent numbers and prominent ratios – ie ignoring other numbers and ratios – can yield 
constancies, propensities to hover around some numbers and ratios, and equilibria in systems 
unrelated to economic fundamentals. 
From examining how participants used numbers in laboratory experiments, Albers (1998a) 
extended prominence theory to a theory of perception and evaluation of numerical responses 
when monetary amounts, probabilities and time is involved.  He has devised a theory of the 
evaluation of lotteries, and a theory of fairness in two person conflicts. He and others have 
found  experimental  evidence  supporting  models  within  the  framework  of  the  Albers 
Prominence  Theory.    These  explain  some  laboratory  data  better  than  prospect  theory  or 
standard game theory Albers (1998b, 2001), Keser and Vogt (2000).  Futhermore Albers has 
located field evidence, the clustering of German stock market prices, Albers (2001). 
Also  in  English-speaking  countries,  in  lay  usage,  the  prominence  structure  of  responses 
predicted by the Albers Prominence Theory has been found to be widespread.  A team from 
the universities of Nottingham and Birmingham, found that numbers in contingent market 
evaluations asked of the lay public exhibit choice of Albers prominent numbers, Whynes, 
Phillips and Frew (2005).  Another team from the universities of East Anglia and Durham 
found that the tendency to choose the logarithmic Albers prominent numbers is more marked 
for health interventions and self-complete surveys than in face-to face interviews, Covey and 
Smith (2006).  Joint work by the two teams, using questionnaires on students validated three 
key predictions of Albers’ Prominence Theory, Whynes et al (2007). 
 
4  Executive Summary 
Decision  makers  need  to  evaluate  alternatives.    We  have  illustrated  the  difficulty  of 
evaluation with the case of a firm that has decided to import an item for which it will have to Pope et al Nominalist Heuristics and Economic Theory    15 July 2008  21 
pay later a bill denominated in a foreign currency.  The firm needs to anticipate the future 
exchange rate in order to decide whether to: 1) hedge; or 2) speculate; or 3) do nothing. This 
evaluation of its three alternatives is stage 2 in the four stages through which decision makers 
progress after encountering a problem.  It is a stage that EUT, axiomatised expected utility 
theory, excludes, as traced in Part 2 of this paper.  In Part 2 we also traced how, despite 
numerous efforts to find an evaluation principle complementary to EUT, including Savage’s 
clarifying sure thing principle and his small worlds proposal, it has proven elusive to combine 
an evaluation stage with EUT.  Prospect theory, and most other variants on EUT, likewise 
ignore stage 2. 
This paper employed a consistent framework for integrating stage 2 into decision models, 
namely models within SKAT, the Stages of Knowledge Ahead Theory, Pope (1983, 1995) 
and Pope, Leitner and Leopold (2006).  Within this theory, we could recognize the necessity 
for new decision models that incorporate the heuristics that economists themselves and others 
employ in performing stage 2.  We have concentrated in this paper on nominalistic heuristics.  
In Part 3 we have introduced this new theoretical construct of a nominalist heuristic and 
traced  the  use  of  nominalism  in  performing  stage  2  by  all  decision  makers,  including 
academic  economists.    We  illustrated  with  a  focus  on  academic  economists’  analyses  of 
exchange rate determination, noting the nominalist heuristic implicit in concepts of a real 
exchange rate and in theories such as that of an optimal currency area.   
We showed that the matter is not one of nominal processes being avoided, because this is both 
impractical and contrary to the scientific spirit of abstracting in order to discern more major 
causal effects.  As economists and psychologists, our job is rather to recognize the role of 
nominalist heuristics in all our analyses, whether descriptive or prescriptive. It is our task to 
discern when our own or other’s nominalism is excessive for the purpose at hand, and should 
be replaced by a richer, less abstracted modelling of cause-effect chains.   
In this paper we have pointed to evidence of excessive nominalism in academic economists’ 
usage of real exchange rates in how it led to arguably erroneous economic advice concerning 
sectoral  advantages  from  appreciations.    We  have  also  pointed  to  evidence  of  excessive 
nominalism in the form of optimal currency area theories, excessive as it has systematically 
and unintentionally biased economic advice on official variation in exchange rates to be of a 
beggar-thy-neighbour nature. 
We have identified that nominal heuristics include prominent number ratios.  If prominent 
number  ratios  enter  exchange  rate  determination,  this  is  essential  to  discern,  since  it 
constitutes an argument against the notion that multiple currencies beneficially equilibrate 
economic  fundamentals.  In  a  sequel  paper,  Pope  et  al  (2009),  we  present  field  and 
experimental evidence that nominalist heuristics in the form of prominent number ratios do 
indeed affect exchange rates.   Pope et al Nominalist Heuristics and Economic Theory    15 July 2008  22 
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